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REIMBURSEMENT AND ACCOUNTING AT TERMINATION
At its 1989 Regular Session, the Louisiana Legislature adopted a
resolution requesting that the Louisiana State Law Institute "study cer-
tain articles of the Civil Code and related laws dealing with reimburse-
ment and accounting between separated or divorced spouses and determine
whether changes in the present language of such articles and laws are
necessary."' There is little question that the manner in which reim-
bursement is to be calculated as a part of the partition proceedings2
and what duties are owed by one former spouse to the other in the
management of unpartitioned former community property3 has created
confusion. However, if the Legislature is to examine the two general
subject matters it should resolve other inequities and discrepancies in
related statutory provisions as well.
Reimbursement Calculation
The circuit courts of this state are in conflict as to whether the trial
court is to deduct reimbursement claims by one spouse against the other
from the net community assets or from the share of the net community
of the obligor spouse. As early as Gachez v. Gachez,4 a fifth circuit
court of appeal decision, that court reasoned that sums to reimburse a
spouse for the use of separate funds to satisfy a community obligation5
or to acquire or benefit community property6 must be deducted from
the net community, because the two pertinent civil code articles essentially
state reimbursement is to be made "if there are community assets from
Copyright 1989, by LoUSIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Jules F. and Frances L. Landry Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. H.R. Res. 6, Reg. Sess. 1989.
2. La. Civ. Code arts. 2348-2368; La. R.S. 9:2801-2802 (1983 and Supp. 1989). See
discussion of this problem in Spaht, Matrimonial Regimes, Developments in the Law,
1984-1985, 46 La. L. Rev. 559, 563-67 (1986).
3. La. Civ. Code art. 2369. See Spaht, Matrimonial Regimes, Developments in the
Law, 1986-1987, 48 La. L. Rev. 371 (1987).
4. 451 So. 2d 608 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 456 So. 2d 166 (1984).
5. La. Civ. Code art. 2365.
.6. La. Civ. Code art. 2367.
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which reimbursement may be made." '7 The Gachez case was cited and
followed in Nash v. Nash,8 a second circuit court of appeal opinion.
Other circuits 9 have repudiated the reasoning of the Gachez and Nash
cases, adopting the view that reimbursement claims are to be satisfied
from the obligor spouse's net share of community assets, since reim-
bursement is a claim to be made by one spouse against the other,'0 not
against the "community" as if it were an entity."
As this author has observed before, 2 it is only after each spouse's
net share of former community property has been calculated that re-
imbursement claims can be asserted by one spouse against the other.
The limitation upon reimbursement claims for the use of separate prop-
erty "was intended to permit reimbursement only if the spouse from
whom it was claimed had a share of former community property that
was sufficient to satisfy the claim."' 3 The difficulty the courts have
encountered in interpreting the pertinent Civil Code articles and statutory
provisions is attributable to the indirect expression selected by the Leg-
islature to convey its intention.' 4 It is the language of the limitation
that has created the confusion. In Davezac v. Davezac5 the court, by
practical example, illustrated the inequitable and unintended result if
reimbursement claims are deducted from net community assets before
calculating each spouse's share:
To adopt appellee's interpretation would lead to the inequitable
result of appellant being "reimbursed" for one-half of the
amounts he paid from funds of which he owns half. The net
7. Id. Actually, the language formulation in La. Civ. Code art. 2365 varies from
that quoted, but conveys the same idea: "Reimbursement may only be made to the extent
of community assets .... "
8. 486 So. 2d 1011 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1986). See also Kaplan v. Kaplan, 522 So.
2d 1344 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1988); Gilley v. Ketchens, 478 So. 2d 683 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1985); Longo v. Longo, 474 So. 2d 500 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 477 So. 2d
711 (1985).
9. Patin v. Patin, 462 So. 2d 1356 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 466 So. 2d
470 (1985); Davezac v. Davezac, 483 So. 2d 1197 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1986); Williams v.
Williams, 509 So. 2d 77 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987); Mara v. Mara, 513 So. 2d 1220 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1987); Cabral v. Cabral, 543 So. 2d 952 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1989).
10. La. Civ. Code art. 2358: "Upon termination of a community property regime,
a spouse may have against the other spouse a claim for reimbursement in accordance
with the following provisions." (emphasis added).
11. La. Civ. Code art. 2336, comment (c): "The community of acquets and gains
is not a legal entity but a patrimonial mass, that is, a universality of assets and liabilities
12. Spaht, supra note 2, at 563-67. See also discussion in K. Spaht and L. Hargrave,
Matrimonial Regimes § 7.14, at 287-91, in 16 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1989).
13. K. Spaht and L. Hargrave, supra note 12, § 7.14, at 287.
14. Id. at 288.
15. 483 So. 2d 1197 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1986).
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result would be that he would pay seventy-five percent of the
payments to maintain a community asset from which the wife
would eventually derive one-half of the proceeds.
6
Recently, the issue of how to calculate reimbursement claims in a
partition suit arose in a situation where "the community" was insolvent-
the community debts exceeded the community assets.' 7 In Kaplan v.
Kaplan8 the husband had proved to the satisfaction of the trial judge
that "the community owes him $116,394."' 9 The trial judge then pro-
ceeded to deduct the total sum due the husband from the community
assets ($135,862 - $116,394 = $19,468), divided the difference between
husband and wife ($9,734), and then the husband was allocated all
community obligations (approximately $180,000, including the federal
tax lien). The wife received $9,734 in assets, but no debts; the husband
received $126,128 in assets, and $180,000 in debt. Obviously, under the
correct calculation method, the community debts should have been de-
ducted from the community assets, and the indebtedness exceeding the
assets should have been allocated equally between the former spouses.20
Even though, as a general principle, the husband's reimbursement
claim is extinguished if the wife has no share of the community from
which this obligation may be satisfied, an exception is made in the case
of "ordinary and customary expenses of the marriage, or for the support,
maintenance, and education of children of either spouse in keeping with
the economic condition of the community." '2' Although the Kaplan court
does not elaborate upon the payments for which the husband is entitled
to receive reimbursement, it does identify them as "insurance premiums,
house payments, taxes, and various interest on loans."' 22 Some of these
expenses probably were ordinary and customary expenses of the marriage,
in which case the wife would owe the husband reimbursement for one-
half the amount 23 even if the community was insolvent. The rationale
16. Id. at 1199.
17. Kaplan v. Kaplan, 522 So. 2d 1344 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1988). Community assets
were valued at $135,862 by the trial judge; "the total amount [of debt] exceeds $140,000,
clearly showing the community to be insolvent." Id. at 1346. "In addition, there is a
federal tax lien of $37,943.27 presently due." Id.
18. 522 So. 2d 1344 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1988).
19. Id. at 1346.
20. This is only implicit in the language of La. R.S. 9:2801(4)(b) (1983) which
ostensibly deals with a solvent community but equal division is a fundamental principle
of our community property law: "The court shall divide the community assets and liabilities
so that each spouse receives property of an equal net value."
21. La. Civ. Code art. 2365.
22. 522 So. 2d at 1346.
23. In an asterisk footnote in the opinion the court observes: "Kaplan was actually
entitled to half the amount of separate funds he spent in fulfillment of community
obligations .... However, since Mrs. Kaplan did not appeal or answer the appeal, this
issue cannot be addressed by this court." Id. at 1347.
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underlying pursuit of these special reimbursement claims is, "The Leg-
islature concluded that ultimately expenses of the marriage, including
support of the children . . .should be borne equally by the spouses....
[If separate property of one spouse is used to satisfy the obligation,
reimbursement imposes responsibility for one-half of that amount by
permitting recovery even if only separate property of the other spouse
is available." 2 4
The trial and appellate courts' reason for ignoring the principle of
equal division was summarized in the following language:
The trial judge was well within his discretion in taking Mrs.
Kaplan's mental illness and resulting financial condition into
account. Under the circumstances of this case, his decision to
order Kaplan to assume all community obligations, in return
for receipt of other community assets, was not an abuse of that
discretion. On the contrary, it is a fair and equitable division
of the community, as contemplated by the statute. 25
Louisiana, however, is not an "equitable" distribution jurisdiction. Civil
Code article 2336 and the special partition statute are rather explicit
pronouncements that our community property law requires equal, not
equitable, distribution. The partition process, under an aggregate theory
that proceeds by allocation of assets and liabilities, may be sensitive to
equity 6 but the end result must be equal division. The courts confused
equitable allocation, with equitable distribution.
Reimbursement for Expenses on Depreciating Movable
Another conflict exists among the various circuit courts of appeal
on whether an ex-spouse owes reimbursement for the use of separate
property to pay a community obligation which was incurred for the
purpose of acquiring what is now former community property-for
example, the use by one spouse of separate funds (i.e., his earnings),
after termination of the community, to pay "the notes" on the car
which is former community property. The reimbursement articles have
been extended to apply to expenditures after termination of the com-
munity, even though the Civil Code articles contemplate such expen-
ditures during the existence of the community. 27
24. K. Spaht and L. Hargrave, supra note 12, § 7.14, at 286.
25. 522 So. 2d at 1347.
26. La. R.S. 9:2801(4)(c) (1983). The court cites the same provision as authority for
the proposition that the distribution may be equitable, not simply the allocation.
27. La. Civ. Code art. 2358: "Upon termination of a community property regime,
a spouse may have against the other spouse a claim for reimbursement .... (emphasis
[Vol. 50
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In Williams v. Williams,28 in a typical pattern of facts, after ter-
mination of the community the husband continued to pay the notes
from his separate property on a vehicle, which was community property.
The wife argued that he was not entitled to reimbursement because he
had "exclusive use" of the automobile and in essence the use value had
to be deducted from the amount of separate funds used to pay the
notes-a roughly equivalent sum. In responding to the wife's argument,
the court observed:
Our brethren of the Fourth and Fifth Circuits have chosen to
treat reimbursements from the separate property differently de-
pending on whether the debt paid was on movable or immovable
property. However, LSA-C.C. art. 2365 makes no such distinc-
tion, and we see no reason to deny appellant [husband] reim-
bursement for one-half of the separate property used to pay the
note on the Subaru automobile. 29
The fourth and fifth circuit courts of appeal decisions referred to
in the Williams case are Davezac v. Davezac ° and Gachez v. Gachez.31
The difference between movable and immovable property which those
two circuits offer to justify a different result is "that an automobile
rapidly depreciates so that its use is directly related to its depreciation" 32
and "[e]quity dictates that appellant be charged for the full amount of
maintaining an asset of which he had exclusive use while that asset
steadily declined in value." '33
The source of the problem in these three cases is the application
of reimbursement principles under community property law, rather than
principles of ordinary co-ownership. At termination of the community,
the former spouses' relationship is that of co-owners. It is a principle
of co-ownership, 34 not community property, that "rent or credit is not
added).
La. Civ. Code arts. 2360, 2361, 2363 lend lexicological support.
The jurisprudence, however, has not restricted the application of these articles to action
taken by a spouse during the existence of the community. See Spaht and Samuel, Equal
Management Revisited, 40 La. L. Rev. 83, 141 (1979); Note, Termination of the Com-
munity, 42 La. L. Rev. 789 (1982).
28. 509 So. 2d 77, 80 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987).
29. Id. at 80.
30. 483 So. 2d 1197 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1986).
31. 451 So. 2d 608 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 456 So. 2d 166 (1984).
32. Davezac v. Davezac, 483 So. 2d 1197, 1199 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1986); see also
Gachez v. Gachez, 451 So. 2d 608, 613 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 456 So. 2d
166 (1984).
33. Davezac, 483 So. 2d at 1199; Gachez, 451 So. 2d at 614.
34. The principle is that each co-owner has a right to possess and occupy the entire
co-owned property without owing his co-owners rent (unless he excludes them).
It is the corruption of this principle in Patin v. Patin, 462 So. 2d 1356 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1985), which resulted in amendments to La. R.S. 9:308(B) (Supp. 1989).
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owed when one spouse occupies the family home while making mortgage
payments, the situation ... involving movable property is distinguish-
able." 5 To be consistent, the same rules that would apply to ordinary
co-owners of a depreciating movable in a case where one pays the debt
but enjoys exclusive use, though not necessarily use to the exclusion of
the other co-owners, should apply to the former spouses.3 6 Yet, the
undeveloped rules governing co-ownership of property contribute to the
confusion that results when the former spouses are no longer partners
in community, but ordinary co-owners with only one unique responsi-
bility. The subject matter of the relationship of the spouses and the
special responsibility of an accounting 7 owed by one spouse to the other
after termination will be discussed in the next section of this article.
By raising generally the equities of a set-off against a spouse's claim
for reimbursement, the Davezac and Gachez cases pose a question for
the reimbursement provisions even in instances where they are properly
applied to actions of a spouse during the existence of the community.
Article 2365 fails to contain counterbalancing equities for the reason
that if separate property is used to satisfy a community obligation-
one for the common interests of the spouses 38-during the existence of
the community, the assumption is that both spouses have agreed to a
use for that property that does not require an offset, except in one
recognized instance.3 9 If the husband in Davezac had used separate funds
during the existence of the community to satisfy an indebtedness on the
family automobile (community obligation), 40 he would be entitled to
recover one-half of the sum without an offset even though the automobile
was used primarily by him. Making assumptions about co-owners', not
spouses', agreements as to use presents different legal and policy issues.
Interestingly enough, even if the satisfaction of a community ob-
ligation occurred during the existence of the community, the legislation
does introduce an equitable consideration. Under Civil Code article 2363
an obligation may be in part community and in part separate-"an
35. Gachez, 451 So. 2d at 613.
36. Exclusive use of a depreciating movable may be ordered by the court under La.
R.S. 9:308(A) (as amended by 1989 La. Acts No. 800).
37. La. Civ. Code art. 2360: "An obligation incurred by a spouse during the existence
of a community property regime for the common interest of the spouses or for the interest
of the other spouse is a community obligation."
La. Civ. Code art. 2361: "Except as provided in Article 2363, all obligations incurred
by a spouse during the existence of a community property regime are presumed to be
community obligations."
38. La. Civ. Code arts. 2360, 2361.
39. La. Civ. Code art. 2363.
40. Cook v. Cook, 457 So. 2d 235 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984); Willis v. Willis, 454
So. 2d 429 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984).
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obligation incurred for the separate property of a spouse to the extent
that it does not benefit the community, the family, or the other spouse,
is likewise a separate obligation." '4 1 The classic example in the juris-
prudence is the case in which a spouse uses community property to
satisfy an obligation incurred for the benefit of the other spouse's
separate property-paying the notes on a house which is separate prop-
erty of one spouse but occupied by the spouses as the family home. 42
The rationale articulated in the decisions is that use of the property by
the "community" is an enjoyment of the fruits of separate property
and the cost of the benefit included the payment of interest . 4 Therefore,
the spouse against whom reimbursement is sought may only recover
one-half of the payments used to discharge the principal amount, not
the portion used to discharge interest. As the author has observed
elsewhere," Article 2363 is a more direct, legally accurate method of
reaching the same result. Regardless of legal reasoning, it is clear that
the legislation is sensitive to the issue of an off-set for the use of the
property as against a claim for reimbursement.
Yet, in the other instance in which reimbursement is permitted-the
use of community or separate property to acquire, benefit, or improve
separate or community property respectively-there is no statutory rec-
ognition of the need to balance benefits received against a claim for
the sum expended. For example, if the wife owns as separate property
a duplex apartment that produces rents (community property), and she
contracts with a painter to improve it, then uses community funds to
pay the painter, it will make a difference if she is entitled to reim-
bursement under Article 2364 or Article 2366. If, by virtue of her contract
with the painter, the wife incurs an obligation and then satisfies it with
community funds, Article 2364 with its accompanying equities in Article
2363 applies. If, on the other hand, her use of community funds to
pay the painter is considered the use of community funds to improve
separate property, there is no statutory authority for recognizing an off-
set for benefits the "community" has enjoyed. This disparity has prompted
another author to observe:
No rational basis for the reimbursement disparity is evident.
Surely the legislature did not intend that a potentially significant
difference in reimbursement be based on the arbitrary decision
41. La. Civ. Code art. 2363; see, e.g., Willis, 454 So. 2d at 431.
42. K. Spaht and L. Hargrave, supra note 12, § 7.14, at 282-84.
43. La. Civ. Code art. 2339: "The natural and civil fruits of the separate property
of a spouse ... are community property. Nevertheless, a spouse may reserve them as
his separate property by a declaration made in an authentic act or in an act under private
signature duly acknowledged."
44. K. Spaht and L. Hargrave, supra note 12, at § 7.19.
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of whether community funds were used to benefit separate prop-
erty or to satisfy a separate obligation. This potential problem
could be avoided by amending article 2366 in a manner that
would take into account the extent to which the community
itself was benefitted by use of a community property. The
remaining amount by which the separate property of a spouse
has benefitted could serve as the basis for reimbursement to the
other spouse. 45
Accoiunting-Article 2369
The relationship of spouses at termination of the community and
the resulting duties of care owed one spouse to the other in the man-
agement of former community property continue to vex the judiciary.
As this author has written on at least two previous occasions 4 6 with
only one exception, the two former spouses are ordinary co-owners after
termination of the community regime and as a general proposition owe
no fiduciary duty to each other to properly manage co-owned assets.
However, if a former spouse asserts control over former community
assets and begins to manage the assets, he has transformed his rela-
tionship from that of an ordinary co-owner to the legal relationship of
negotiorum gestor.4 7 The one exception previously alluded to is the
fiduciary duty to account to the other spouse if a spouse had community
property under his control at termination. The duty to account requires
the spouse to explain the disposition of the community property under
his control at termination, or be responsible to the other spouse for
one-half the value of the property. 48
In Richardson v. Richardson49 the wife sought "in essence . . . an
accounting for revenues allegedly due to her from the corporation by
virtue of her co-ownership of the corporation's stock." 50 Rejecting the
wife's claims for an accounting, the court observed that the payment
of sums for which she sought an accounting were property of the
corporation and what she owned was simply the stock. Therefore, "[t]he
fruits or revenues attributable to this stock, not the direct earnings of
the corporation itself, would belong in part to the plaintiff."'" The court
then commented upon what the wife had failed to prove:
45. Note, Termination of the Community, 42 La. L. Rev. 789, 803 (1982).
46. Spaht, supra note 3; Spaht, supra note 2.
47. La. Civ. Code arts. 2295-2299.
48. La. Civ. Code art. 2369: "A spouse owes an accounting to the other spouse for
community property under his control at the termination of the community.
49. 540 So. 2d 1254 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1989).




Plaintiff did not attempt to prove that any diminished value of
the corporate stock resulted from any negligent management by
defendant during his possession and control of the corporate
business.1
A further illustration of the type of problem that can arise after
termination of the community is the case of Barbin v. Barbin.53 The
wife complained that the trial court had failed to charge the husband
with interest on community funds under his control at termination. To
this "novel claim' '1 4 the court of appeal responded: "We know of no
theory of law that requires a former partner in community to invest
community funds prior to partition so that they will earn interest in
the interim between dissolution of the community and the date of
partition."" Concluding that her claim was not "based the same as
those cases represented by Hodson v. Hodson"' 6 (later referred to by
the court as "the so-called ex delicto cases"),57 the court denied the
wife the legal interest claimed. Rather than allege and prove that com-
munity funds, which were under the husband's control, no longer existed
under Civil Code article 2369,58 the wife claimed that the community
funds were simply idle. The correct answer ultimately lies in the legal
relationship of the two former spouses after termination of the com-
munity and the determination of the proper legal standard applicable
to their conduct. It is an issue that Judge Redmann recognized earlier
in his opinion in Lococo v. Lococo: 9
[T]he petition alleges deterioration because of mere failure by
the ex-husband to repair and maintain, rather than because of
deliberate or negligent damage by him. That states no claim
because failure to spend rent money on maintenance and repairs
means more money divided between the former co-owners in
the partition. 60
52. Id. (emphasis added).
53. 546 So. 2d 609 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1989).
54. Id. at 610.
55. Id. at 611.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. La. Civ. Code art. 2369: "A spouse owes an accounting to the other spouse for
community property under his control at the termination of the community property
regime ...."
59. Lococo v. Lococo, 462 So. 2d 893 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984).
60. 462 So. 2d at 896 (Redmann, C.J., concurring).
See comment (c) to La. Civ. Code art. 2369, which has been criticized by the author
elsewhere as inaccurate in describing the obligation to account, but it is correct in
articulating the duty of co-owner spouses after termination of the community: "Thus, he
ought to be accountable for any loss or deterioration of the things under his control
attributed to his fault.
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California has chosen to be explicit about the standard of care in
its statutory provisions regulating community property after termination.
Unlike Louisiana, with the one exception of the obligation to account, 6'
and the Uniform Marital Property Act,62 California imposes the obli-
gation of "good faith" in the management of community assets after
termination of the community before the property is partitioned. 63 It is
the same obligation imposed on the spouses during the existence of the
community, 64 so it is simply a logical extension of the standard of care
beyond termination. Under Louisiana law it would be inaccurate to
describe the obligation one spouse owes to the other during marriage
as one of "good faith." A spouse is liable to the other for loss if he
manages community property fraudulently or in bad faith .65 Because the
former spouses may feel hostility to each other after legal separation
or divorce, their relationship is not in actuality like that of ordinary
co-owners. It may be appropriate for the legislature to recognize this
fact and impose a special statutory responsibility or standard of care
in managing former community assets upon former spouse co-owners
even though the same duty would be inappropriate if applied to co-
owners generally. At least considering such a proposal would focus
attention upon an area of the law that is both ignored and misunder-
stood.
61. See supra note 58 for the text of the article.
62. Uniform Marital Property Act § 17(3), 9A U.L.A. (1983): "Except as provided
in Section 16: ... (3) After a dissolution, each former spouse owns an undivided one-
half interest in the former marital property as a tenant in common except as provided
otherwise in a decree or written consent ......
63. Cal. Civ. Code § 5125(e) (West 1983 and Supp. 1989):
Each spouse shall act in good faith with respect to the other spouse in the
management and control of the community property in accordance with the
general rules which control the actions of persons having relationships of personal
confidence as specified in Section 5103, until such time as the property has
been divided by the parties or by a court. This duty includes the obligation to
make full disclosure to the other spouse of the existence of assets in which the
community has an interest and debts for which the community may be liable,
upon request. . . . In no event shall this standard be interpreted to be less than
that of good faith in confidential relations nor as high as that established by
former Title 8 (commencing with Section 2215) of Part 4 of Division 3 . ...
64. Cal. Civ. Code § 5125(e) (West 1983 & Supp. 1989): "Each spouse shall act in
good faith with respect to the other spouse in the management and control of the
community property in accordance with the general rules which control the actions of
persons having relationships of personal confidence as specified in Section 5103, until
such time as the property has been divided by the parties or by a court ... (emphasis
added).
65. La. Civ. Code art. 2354.
